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The negative neural correlates of 
consciousness
ĘĘĆĞ
For a long time, scientists and philosophers alike have been 
ȋȌǤ
ϐǡ
whose occurrence correlates with our phenomenal experiences. 
In this essay, we motivate the introduction of the concept of 
 Ǯ    ǯ ȋȌǤ 

occurrence inversely correlates with a given phenomenal 
experience. We wish to introduce this concept for two reasons. 
	ǡϐ















In his seminal essay “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?” David 
Chalmers (2000) discussed important conceptual aspects and caveats of the notion 
of a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). He roughly approximated an NCC 
as a neural system N whose state correlates directly with states of consciousness. 
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Taking this approximation as a starting point, he then focused his attention on two 
aspects: what the relevant states of consciousness are and what it means for a state 
ǤƤȄȄ
 ơ       Ǥ ǡ
background states of consciousness (awake, asleep, dreaming, under hypnosis), 
ǤƤǦ
states of subjective experience that one is in at any given time (e.g. experience of 
a particular visual image, of a particular sound pattern, of a detailed stream of 
ȌǤǡƤ




“An NCC is a minimal neural system N such that there is a mapping from 
ǡƥǡ




“An NCC (for content) is a minimal neural representational system N such 
  ƥǡǡ 
representation of that content in consciousness“ (Chalmers, 2000, p.22).
Several authors have pointed out potential shortcomings and blind spots of these 
ƤǤȋ͜͜͞͠Ȍ
internalist assumption and that this assumption by itself is still a matter of debate 
within philosophy of mind. Cleeremans (2005) drew attention to the fact that we 
should not only focus our search on neural correlates but also on  
correlates of consciousness. Finally, de Graaf, Hsieh and Sack (2012) argued that the 
term ‘correlate’ in ‘neural correlate of consciousness’ is ambiguous and needs to be 
ƤǤǡ
Ǥȋ͜͞͝͞Ȍ
fall into one of three distinct categories: It may be a prerequisite, a consequence, or 
the actual substrate of a conscious experience. Prerequisites and consequences of 
a conscious state are likely to be very general and may for example include neural 
mechanisms that are also associated with arousal and wakefulness.  For instance, 
there are neural systems in the brain stem that are most likely important for general 
arousal and wakefulness, but these systems are probably not directly relevant for the 
ƤǤ
 Ƥ  Ǧ   ǡ    
ȄǤ
neural substrate is the neural state that is directly underlying the experience and is 
ƤǤ
substrate that is most relevant to the consciousness debate (de Graaf et al., 2012). 
Overall, Chalmers’ original NCC concept has led to a very productive debate, and 
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ƤƤǤ
 In this essay, we would like to present a further complement to the traditional 
concept of an NCC. An important aspect that has often been only implicitly assumed 
(or even neglected) in the past conceptual debate about the NCC is that the concept 
of correlation implies both positive and negative correlation. This becomes apparent 
ȋ͜͜͜͞ȌƤ
from a neural system N to states of consciousness. As we argue below, representation 
     ƥ      
consciousness if, at the same time, the content in systems other than N is prevented 
ǤƤ
conceptually as negative correlation. In this context, a positive correlation means 
that if a neural event N
1
 is present, a corresponding state of conscious experience P
1
 





, while a phenomenal experience P
1
 





 will be as crucial as the presence of event N
1
 for conscious content) has not, or 
ǡǤǯƤǡ
 ǡ     ƤǤ




 the negative neural correlate of consciousness 
ȋȌǤǡơ
conceptual framework, able to motivate new hypotheses and research.
 Although the NNCC concept is based on a fairly simple idea we believe that it 
is not trivial. In fact, we argue that the concept of negative correlation matters for 
the search for NNCs, for two main reasons. First, as has long been recognized in the 
philosophy of science, a set of events can only be ƥơǦ
if the set includes an open-ended  clause excluding the presence of 
potential disruptors that could intervene to prevent E (Hoefer, 2010; Russell,1912). 
ǡȋȌƥ
conscious state, we will be forced to include an open-ended list that ensures the 
absence of potential ‘content disrupters’. Content disrupters can be understood 
     ƥ
from representative neural systems to conscious experiences. Here, we suggest that 
a more elegant solution to this problem is to pair each NCC with a corresponding 
ǡ  Ƥ   Ǥ ǡ     
motivation to complement the conventional (‘positive’) NCC by a corresponding 
NNCC. We argue that an NCC by itself is not able to account for the content of 
a corresponding conscious experience. To fully predict the content of a conscious 
experience, the NCC needs to be paired up with an NNCC. Consequently, an NCC (in 
ǮǯȌƥ
conscious state. This argument is based on the Integrated Information Theory of 
Consciousness (IITC; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012). For these reasons, we think that the 
concept of a NNCC has important implications for the debate about consciousness 
and the search for the brain states corresponding to conscious experience. 
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FIRST REASON: THE SUFFICIENCY PROBLEM
The basic assumption underlying the search for an NCC over the last 20 years 
Ƥƥ
Ǥǡƥ
problems, as has long been recognized in the philosophy of science (Russell, 1912). 
To understand why that is the case, imagine that we say that a set of events A, B, C 
ƥǲǳǤ	ǡ
let us say that these three events are: I am thirsty (A), I want to quench my thirst 
with a beer (B) and I assume there is beer in the fridge (C).
 If the set A, B, C is present, I will go to the fridge and have my beer. No worries 
here. However, let us consider three alternative scenarios. Imagine that the set A, 
B, C is present but that just when I am about to go to the fridge my friend tells me 
that there is no more beer in the fridge. Or, imagine that just when I want to get up 
ơǤơ
case, imagine that when I am already in the kitchen a bird crashes into the kitchen 
windowpane and because I am much of a bird carer I hurry to its rescue. These 
scenarios highlight the point that suddenly the set of events A, B, C will not be 
ƥǤǡǡ
are conjointly present and on every usual day would have been enough to make me 
have a beer, in these scenarios they were not.
 ǡǦƤǤ
ǡǡƥ
friend does not tell me that no beer is left, I do notơǡno 
bird crashes into the kitchen window. Yet, as becomes easily apparent the list of 
things that do not ǡǡƥơǦ
will be endless. We would, for example, also need to exclude that one of my ancestor 
died before she could participate in the reproduction relevant for my case, and that 
I did not choke on a pretzel the day before I wanted to get my beer, and so forth. 
ǡƥǡ
to accept an open-ended list of negative conditions. Such an open-ended 
 clause is certainly unsatisfactory from a philosophical point of view.
 Why do these considerations matter for the concept of a (content) NCC? Let us 
assume that there is a minimal neural event N1. And let us furthermore assume that 
N1 is the perfect content NCC for the conscious experience P1. Thus, whenever N1 
occurs a corresponding state of conscious experience P1 will also occur. According 
ǯȋ͜͜͜͞ȌƤǡ͝ƥ͝Ǥ
However, consider the case that simultaneously to N1 another neural event N2 also 
occurs. This co-occurrence does not necessarily cause the phenomenal experience 
͝ơ͞
(see below for a concrete example). Again, we could modify and say that N1 will still 
ƥ͝͞ǤȄȄ
would leave us with an open-ended list of potential disrupters that we would need 
to exclude. We suggest calling events like N2 , for their occurrence 
  ƥ    
systems to conscious experiences like P1. As we hope to have shown in this section, 
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       ȋȌ ƥ   
conscious state, this would force us to include an open-ended  clause 
excluding the presence of potential content disruptors that could intervene to 
prevent P1.
SECOND REASON: THE INFORMATION INTEGRATION THEORY OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS
In addition to the before mentioned philosophical motivation for introducing an 
NNCC, we think that the NNCC can be further motivated and sustained by the help 
of a thought experiment. The thought experiment is inspired by Guilio Tononi’s 
Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (2004, 2008) as well as by his 
recent book “Phi” (2012).
THE PHOTODIODE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
ǡơ
that all sounds are absent. The sound of your own breathing can be neglected for 
now. Assume further that you have regular functioning of your body including your 
brain and that you are awake and thus fully conscious. Everything is black and you 
have the conscious experience of seeing black only; the room is perfectly quiet and 
you are not exposed to any other sensory sensations. Imagine too that there is also 
a photodiode in the room. A photodiode is an electronic component that senses 
Ǥ   ơ  
states: dark or light. If one were to ask you now whether you experience darkness 
or lightness, you would in all likelihood say ‘darkness’ since the room is dark. If one 
were to consult the photodiode about the same question, it would equally signal 
‘darkness’. Does that mean the photodiode has the same phenomenal experience 
you have? The intuitive answer is ‘no’. We guess that most people would intuitively 
deny that the photodiode has any conscious experience at all. Yet, we cannot be sure 
of this since there is no consciousness meter to check, and intuition can trick us into 
conclusions that are very remote from the truth. 
 In order to ground answers in a sounder framework, let us refer to Guilio 
Tononi’s (2004, 2008) Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness. According 
to this theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate 
information. This proposition is based on two phenomenological properties of 
consciousness: the unity of conscious experience (conscious experience is always 
Ȍơ
ȋơȌǤ     ơ  
states. Furthermore, the theory suggests measuring the degree of integrated 
information as the phi value of a system. According to the theory then, both the 
human and the photodiode in the dark room are conscious. Yet, the human is 
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conscious to a much higher degree than the photodiode is (the human has a much 
higher phi value). One might wonder how that is possible even though both human 
Ȅǡ
Ȅ Ǥ   
of the human to integrate information is higher than that of the photodiode. The 
ơ
integration aspect, which should be similar, but it lies in the information aspect. 
The human integrates much more information than the photodiode does. In this 
context, information is understood as the reduction of uncertainty among a number 
of alternative states. Thus, information is mainly a measure of which phenomenal 
experiences are excluded by the current phenomenal experience. If the photodiode 
is in the conscious state of experiencing ‘dark’, it only excludes one single other 
state (‘light’) and therefore does not generate much information. By contrast, if the 
human is in the conscious state of only experiencing ‘dark’, this excludes a myriad 
of other possible phenomenal states. If a human only experiences the blackness of a 
dark room, this experience excludes the possibility that the human at that moment 
experiences blue, green, yellow, white, and any other colour. Yet, it does not only 
exclude the possibility of experiencing colours or seeing anything else (shapes, 
faces, words). It furthermore excludes the possibility that the human was, at that 
moment, experiencing any other sensation be it a sound, smell, touch or an itchy 
right foot. Moreover, the example phenomenal state excludes experiencing any 
possible combination of the aforementioned sensations. Thus, this one particular 
phenomenal experience excludes an unlimited number of alternative phenomenal 
states for the human, while it excludes only a single other states for the photodiode. 
ơǡǯơǡ
one of the human is immensely so. As a result, the human is much more conscious 
than the photodiode; yet, the photodiode is still conscious with one bit because it 
ơȋǡ͜͜͞͠ȌǤ
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHOTODIODE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
What implications do the insights gained above have for the search for an NCC? 
We think that the thought experiment with the photodiode and the Integrated 
Information Theory of Consciousness imply the concept of a negative neural 
correlate of consciousness (NNCC). The total absence of light, as in the thought 
experiment, is a special case because the absence of light implies the absence of any 
colour. Therefore, let us now assume that the room is illuminated in blue. In this 
case, the human in the room would have the phenomenal experience of seeing blue. 
ƤǦǦ
perspective of brain data, researchers can proceed in two steps: First, they can try 
to identify the content NCC for experiencing blue (via bridging principles). Second, 
if this content NCC is present, they can predict the corresponding phenomenal 
experience to occur. If the content NCC were absent, they would predict the absence 
of the phenomenal experience. This is what we call a  content NCC. As 
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science stands at the moment, the occurrence of particular neural events within 
͠ͤ
colours.
 Consider the ideal case (for a neuroscientist) that a particular neural event in 
͠ͤǡ
Ƥ
neural prerequisites or neural consequences of consciousness. Hence, there would 
ȋȌƤ
neural events. If we wish to predict the content of experience from brain data, would 




blue (and positively correlate with the experience of colours other than blue) equally 
contribute to our experience of blue, namely by their absence. This may sound 
ƤǤǡ 
ơǡǡ
is that being in a particular phenomenal state excludes a myriad of other possible 
phenomenal states. The phenomenal state of experiencing only blue excludes all 
other possible states of colour experience. Thus, when we want to predict a given 
ƤǦ       ǡ     
those neural events that doȋǤǤ͠ͤȌǤ
Additionally, we need to consider other possible neural events that do not occur. 
ơǦ
information is generated and we are conscious the way we are. Only by considering 
ơǦǡ
like to be in a blue room for a human, as opposed, for example, for a photodiode.
There is no reason to restrict the NNCC to the colour domain or even the visual 
domain. The same reasoning equally applies to other sensory domains such as 
sound, smell, taste and touch. Moreover, internally generated sensations, thoughts, 
or states of mind cannot be ignored either and likewise have to be considered in the 
search for negative content NCCs.
NNCC – ATTEMPT OF A FORMAL DEFINITION
ǤǡƤ
may not only be important which neural events are , but also which ones 
are . According to our proposal, the quality and content of phenomenal 
experiences is not only determined by the presence, but also by the absence of 
ǤǡƤƥ
to produce a particular phenomenal experience would not only have to include the 
presence of certain neural events, but also the absence of others. This idea of an 
NNCC can be expressed more formally.
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NNCC EQUALS NOMOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY SPACE MINUS NCC OF THE 
GIVEN EXPERIENCE




. Let us further assume that each 
ƤǡǮǯ




 represents content 
of some sort. Thus, if one of these neural events, for example event N
i
, occurred, 
one may predict the occurrence of a corresponding phenomenal experience P
i
. In 
accordance with Chalmers’ (2000) conceptual framework, N
i
 would be minimally 
ƥ     
i
. However, we claim that the quality and 
content of the phenomenal experience P
i
 is just as much determined by the absence 
of the set of neural events S ¬ N
i
. We suggest calling this set S ¬ N
i
 the 
 of the conscious experience P
i




 In fact, as we have argued, the set S should be global and include all neural 
events for which there is a possibility that the event be an NCC. First, this is 
because not including all those events would force us to make endless additional 
Ƥ
presence could intervene to prevent P
i
. Secondly, it should include all neural events 
because it is the exclusion of these events that generates information and thus 
eventually conscious experience. If we do not account for all of them, we will not be 
ơ
a human when perceiving darkness.
 When we say that the set S has to include all neural events that could possibly be 
NCCs, we are concerned with nomological possibility and not with logical possibility. 
In other words, the set S has to include all neural events that could be an NCC, given 
the way an individual brain is structured and functions, and given the laws of nature 
that determine how brains produce phenomenal experiences. In contrast, the set S 
does not have to include all neural events that could hypothetically be an NCC in 
ơơǡ
 ƪǤ	ǡ
call S the nomological possibility space for NCCs. For a given conscious experience, 
Ƥ
the NCC of the given experience itself. Pairing up the NCC with a corresponding 
NNCC enables us to make sure that the neural correlate we are searching for is truly 
ƥ ǤƤ
may bring us a considerable step closer to predicting conscious experience from 
brain data.  
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is the neural correlate of P
i
. However, we think that this is clearly not satisfactory 
because conditions C are not supposed to comprise components that are related to 
ƤǤǡ
content-invariant background processes. Therefore, a better solution is to amend 
our concept of the neural correlate of P
i
. Accordingly, the true neural correlate of P
i
 





. If and only if both the positive correlate Ni occurs and the negative correlate S ¬ 
N
i
 does not occur, under conditions C, does this lead to the phenomenal experience 
P
i





. Therefore, negative neural correlates should not be disregarded in the 
search for a neural correlates of consciousness.
REINTERPRETING EMPIRICAL RESULTS – A CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF 
THE NNCC FRAMEWORK
Admittedly, given the current limitations of neuroimaging, especially in humans, it 
will not be possible in the near future, if ever, to map out the nomological possibility 
space for NCCs. Thus, empirical scientists might turn away disappointedly from our 
all too theoretical speculations. Yet we think that even for those scientists the NNCC 
ơǤ
point can be illustrated by the example of past research on perceiving stationary 
and moving stimuli.
Several investigators (Beckers & Hoemberg, 1992; Sack, Kohler, Linden, Goebel, 
Ƭ ǡ ͜͜͢͞Ǣ ǡ ǡ Ƭ ǡ ͜͜͞͡Ȍ   
 ȋȌ     ͡     
akinetopsia. Participants were presented with moving random dot patterns and 
had to identify the direction of movement. During particular time windows, TMS 
͡Ǥ  ơ ȋǤǡ
͜͜͢͞ǢǤǡ͜͜͞͡Ȍơ




stimulus is obliterated in general, but that the percept loses a certain phenomenal 




be part of a negative correlate for the perception of a stationary stimulus. In the 
following, we are going to further strengthen this claim.
ơ
to a moving stimulus. For instance, imagine you look at a waterfall for about a 
ǡǤƤơ
ǡ  Ǥơ 
ƤƤǤ
ơȋǤǡͥͥ͝͡ǢǤǡ
1999; He, Cohen, & Hu, 1998), and it was shown that the illusionary movement 
of stationary stimuli after movement adaptation correlates with activity in area 
͡Ǥ	ǡ͡
adaptation to a moving stimulus. Rather, it only activates when a stimulus is 
    Ƥ ơ 





 Additional evidence comes from an animal study in which electrical 
microstimulation was applied to direction-sensitive neurons in monkey area 
͡ǡȋǡǡƬǡ ͥͥ͜͝ȌǤ
Ǥ͡
that had a particular movement direction preference were stimulated, the monkeys’ 
reports were biased towards this direction. Although no introspective verbal 
report can be obtained in an animal study, the monkeys’ behaviour suggests that 
the microstimulation probably induced an illusory percept of movement into a 
particular direction.
    ơ    
͡Ǥ
It appears that in order to perceive a visual stimulus as stationary, certain neural 
͡notǤǡȄ
even if in fact it is stationary. If, for instance, after having looked at a waterfall for 
a minute or so one directs their gaze at a rock face next to the waterfall, a stripe 
of rock appears to be moving upwards. Hence, we expect the neural substrate of 
consciously perceiving the same rock face without movement to include a negative 
Ȅ͡Ǥ
POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE NNCC AMENDMENT
We would like to respond to several anticipated objections to our NNCC framework. 
First, it could be argued that the NNCC framework is not backed up by empirical 
observations. Secondly, one could object that if we took the NNCC framework 
seriously, we would have to include the whole brain as a content NNCC for any given 
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conscious experience. Thirdly, the NNCC framework might be considered irrelevant 
for human-to-human comparisons. In the following, we will deal with each of these 
objections in turn.
THE NNCC FRAMEWORK IS CONCEPTUAL, NOT EMPIRICAL
The nature of our argumentation is conceptual, not empirical. As things currently 
stand, we do not know the exact neural events that cause a particular phenomenal 
state, although many empirical candidates for an NCC have been proposed, such as 
40 Hz oscillations (Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel & Singer, 2001), fast recurrent cortical 
feedback (Lamme, 2010), and many others. Therefore, we want our framework to be 
ơǡ
to these as ‘neural events’. In this context, it is important to note that the positive and 
negative neural correlates of a phenomenal experience can probably not simply be 
equated with two neural populations that ought to be active and silent, respectively, 
to cause a particular phenomenal experience. It is an open empirical question to 
Ƥǡ
consider one example NNC in order to elucidate why the NNCC cannot necessarily 
     Ƥ Ǥ  ȋͥͤͤ͝Ȍ     
content becomes phenomenally conscious if it has access to the ‘global workspace’. 
On the neural level, access to the global workspace could be mediated by a change in 
the synchronisation of neural populations (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, 
Ƭǡ͜͜͢͞ǢƬǡ͜͜͞͝ȌǤǡ
Ƥ
the relevant neural populations, but only a change in the timing (i.e. the phase) of 
spikes. This point illustrates why we prefer to use the term ‘neural events’ instead of 
for example ‘neural activity’.
THE NNCC IS GLOBAL IN AN ANATOMICAL SENSE, BUT SPECIFIC IN A 
FUNCTIONAL SENSE
Another objection to our proposal could be that the NNCC framework suggests 
including the whole brain as a content NNCC for any given conscious experience. 
Then, it could be contended that nothing would be gained by doing so. We would 
like to respond in two ways. 
First, let us come back to the above example of experiencing a stationary visual 
stimulus. Again, the NNCC does not predict a total absence of activity in neural 
population. Even if a person is experiencing a stationary visual stimulus, motion 
͡
all metabolic and neural activity. The NNCC states that precisely those neural 
events that would give rise to the conscious experience of motion are not present. 
For instance, let us assume that fast recurrent cortical backward projections are 
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necessary for any conscious experience. Then we would argue that in order to perceive 
a given stimulus as stationary, no fast recurrent cortical feedback projections from 
͡͝Ǥǡ 
neural activity in a relevant brain area or cortical module or between these. Rather, 
it selectively excludes precisely those neural events that would give rise to conscious 
experience. Therefore, the NNCC is global in an anatomical sense, since the neural 
events that would act as a content disrupter for the respective phenomenal state 
ǤǡƤ
a functional sense, because it only excludes precisely those neural events that are 
relevant for bringing about consciousness.
 Having acknowledged the anatomically global character of the NNCC 
framework, we would like to voice a second response to the criticism that our proposal 
 ƤǤǡ
complex are unlikely to be included in our search. Neural events in the cerebellum, 
for instance, may neither qualify as a content NCC nor as a NNCC, for neither their 
presence nor absence contributes to our phenomenal experience. According to all 
the clinical and experimental evidence that has been gathered so far, the cerebellum 
does not contribute to our phenomenal experience (Tononi, 2012). This is accounted 
for by Tononi’s (2004, 2008) theory, which assumes that although the cerebellum 
performs very sophisticated calculations, it is incapable of integrating information 
and thus does never correspond to conscious experience. Similarly, the processes 
in the brainstem and other subcortical systems do not need to be included in an 
ǦǦƤ
ƤǤ
 A good guideline for deciding whether a neuronal event is an NNCC is 
to look whether there is any (nomologically) possible situation or case in which 
       Ȅ 
whether it contributes at the very moment we measure it. If there is the nomological 
possibility, then the neuronal event should be considered as an NNCC. If there is 
no such possible case, like for the cerebellum, then it should not be considered as 
an NNCC. From all we know at the moment, the thalamocortical system might be a 
good starting point to look for content NNCCs. 
THE NNCC FRAMEWORK ALLOWS ACCOUNTING FOR HUMAN-TO-
HUMAN VARIABILITY
Finally, another objection in the vicinity may be that the notion of an NNCC is 
not all too relevant for human-to-human comparisons. Critics might say that it is 
reasonable to expect that the nomological possibility space is roughly the same across 
humans. The NNCCs thus could be kept constant and would not matter too much 
for human-to-human comparisons. However, making this simplifying assumption 
would only address the problem resulting from the IITC (second reason) but not 
ƥȋƤȌǤ	ǡ
be prepared to face some considerable human-to-human variability in the content 
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of phenomenal experiences; maybe we could simply ignore it so far because of the 
limitations in our current methods of comparison (e.g. verbal reports).
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A particularly interesting direction for future research would be to investigate 
the predictions made by the NNCC framework at a microscopic level. Could it for 
example be that the neural correlate of perceiving the colour red at a given location 
ƤǦ
Ƥǡ
the absence of the same neural events in other colour-sensitive cells in the same 
module? A similar logic may apply to the conscious perception of orientation. 
         ơ
 Ǥ  ͡  ǡ  Ǯǯ   
the content NNCC of perceiving a stationary stimulus? Does it reduce the overall 
capacity of visual consciousness? The NNCC framework predicts that the answer to 
these questions is yes. So what are the consequences of extreme lesions, such as for 
example severing the two cortical hemispheres like in split-brain patients, for the 
neural correlates of consciousness? We hope that the NNCC framework will inspire 
an interesting debate and further empirical investigations.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We introduced the concept of a negative neural correlate of consciousness 
(NNCC). An NNCC can be understood as a neural event that contributes to the 
content of phenomenal experience via its absence. Our framework is motivated 
ƥǤ	ǡǯ
(2004, 2008) information integration theory of consciousness, according to which 
“consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information” 
ȋǡ͜͜͞͠ǡǤ͝ȌǤǡƪ
in the fact that conscious systems  information, and the complexity of 
conscious experience is dependent on the ability of the system to ơ 
between many alternative states. If consciousness is characterised by the integration 
   ơ   ǡ    
states that are excluded in our search for the neural correlate of consciousness. 
ǡƤ
important which neural events are present, but also which ones are absent. After 
all, the quality and content of phenomenal experiences is not only determined by 
ǡ Ǥǡ Ƥ
ƥ
experience would not only have to include a certain set of neural events that are 
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